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The First Amendment’s Global Dimension
Timo thy Zick

–Timothy Z ick, William & Mary Law School
In my f orthcoming book, The Cosmopolitan First Amendment (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2013—Part I of the book
is available here), I discuss the manner in which the First Amendment’s various guarantees relate to and
intersect with international borders. T he book takes an extended and systematic look at what might be called
the non-domestic aspects of expressive and religious liberties. Although the Internet has f orced this subject
to the f ore, particularly insof ar as f reedom of speech is concerned, digital expression is not the only relevant
concern. In a more general sense, what is at stake is the extent to which the First Amendment protects
Americans’ (and perhaps, in some cases, aliens’) ability to speak, associate, collaborate, and commingle with
people located around the world.
Only some of this activity takes place online. Americans travel abroad in search of inf ormation and f or
purposes of religious f ellowship. T hey invite f oreign visitors to the United States. Many Americans, including
government of f icials, collaborate and associate with f oreign NGOs, international activists, f oreign government
of f icials, f oreign religious leaders, and international organizations that f ocus on issues ranging f rom
democracy to disease prevention. Some of this activity occurs solely in domestic f orums. However, much of
this activity crosses international borders and some occurs beyond U.S. shores.
In the United States, judicial precedents grant notably weak protection to activities that cross or occur beyond
international borders. For example, the United States Supreme Court has held that U.S. citizens do not have a
First Amendment right to travel abroad (merely a weaker due process “f reedom” not to have egress denied
arbitrarily). Aliens who have taken controversial positions in their home nations have been excluded f rom the
United States, sometimes based upon the thinnest of governmental justif ications. According to the Supreme
Court, any “f acially valid and bona f ide” reason will suf f ice. Although the Supreme Court has held that U.S.
citizens have a right under the First Amendment to associate with aliens, that right is subject to restrictions
that do not apply to solely domestic collaborations. Citizens have a First Amendment right to receive some
inf ormation f rom f oreign sources. However, some courts and commentators have questioned whether crossborder communications come f ully within the domain of the Free Speech Clause. T he constitutional status of
association, press, petition, and f ree exercise liberties in this non-domestic realm also remains uncertain.
Finally, whether the Free Speech Clause, the Establishment Clause, and other First Amendment limits apply to
governmental action abroad has not been def initively settled. Immigration, national security, and f oreign
af f airs concerns have all been cited as justif ications f or the dif f erential, and of ten second-class, treatment of
transborder liberties.
In the book, I f ocus on these and other transborder and transnational concerns. Two recent cases highlight
what is at stake in this relatively uncharted First Amendment territory. T he cases raise important questions
concerning the right to collaborate with f oreign citizens and organizations in peacef ul endeavors, the U.S.
government’s power to compel or communicate messages in global marketplaces, and the purported distinction
between “domestic” and “f oreign” First Amendment liberties.
In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (2010), the Supreme Court upheld against f ree speech and association
challenges U.S. laws criminalizing the provision of “material support” to designated f oreign terrorist
organizations. T he case involved a group of American citizens who wished, among other things, to assist
certain f oreign organizations with the f iling of petitions at the United Nations and to educate f oreign groups
regarding peacef ul methods of dispute resolution. T he Court held that otherwise peacef ul and lawf ul speech

that was “coordinated” with these groups could be subject to criminal penalty, even if there was no showing of
intent to f urther the groups’ violent ends. T he Court purported to carve out a saf e harbor f or “independent”
communications supporting such organizations. T he government argued that “coordinated” expression could
“legitimize” f oreign terrorist organizations and aid their terrorist operations. Although it purported to apply
strict scrutiny, the Court def erred to the administration’s national security and f oreign af f airs concerns –
including the concern that some f oreign nations might take of f ense were the United States to permit its
citizens to praise or legitimize organizations that participated in violent acts in those nations. For similar
reasons, the Court also rejected the claim that the material support laws inf ringed the group members’ First
Amendment rights of expressive association. At the end of its majority opinion, the Court observed, without
elaboration, that it may not have reached the same result had the organizations and activities in question been
solely “domestic” in nature.
T he second case involves a less direct f orm of restriction on cross-border expression and association. T he
United States f unds a variety of activities, initiatives, and campaigns abroad. For example, it provides f unds
f or media outlets, organizations dedicated to spreading democratic principles, and educational initiatives. A
portion of f ederal f unds are directed to global ef f orts aimed at eradicating diseases, including HIV/AIDS.
Pursuant to the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003, the United
States requires that all domestic and f oreign organizations receiving such f unds adopt a policy explicitly
opposing prostitution. In Alliance for Open Society v. U.S. Agency for International Development, the Supreme
Court will decide whether this requirement violates the First Amendment rights of domestic NGOs that
participate in global HIV/AIDS prevention work. T he dispute involves consideration of the byzantine
“unconstitutional conditions” doctrine. Specif ically, it raises the question whether the United States
government can compel U.S. f und recipients to espouse a position abroad that they would not otherwise
adopt, as a condition on receipt of f ederal f unds.
Among other things, the material support laws and the Leadership Act demonstrate the ef f ects that domestic
laws can have on expressive and associative activities that cross international borders. Part of my argument in
the book is that we ought to think more caref ully about these ef f ects, and to think of them as central or core
rather than peripheral First Amendment concerns.
As a result of the material support laws, U.S. citizens must now take special care that their collaborative
endeavors with certain disf avored f oreign organizations do not cross the hazy line f rom “independent” to
“coordinated” advocacy. T his may chill Americans’ ability to editorialize, engage in legal advocacy, collaborate
with f oreign organizations, and participate in other expressive activities. Indeed, broad application of the
material support laws to Americans’ expressive and associative activities could materially alter or even sever
important cross-border links between U.S. citizens and f oreign organizations. It is f undamentally inconsistent
with the central justif ications and principles of the First Amendment to presume that no designated f oreign
terrorist organization is open to peacef ul persuasion or education. If this strikes some as naïve, it might be
usef ul to recall American history with regard to anarchist, communist, and other organizations once considered
radioactive by the U.S. government. Like these other ideologies, terrorism is a global threat that challenges our
true commitment to persuasion, counter-speech, and other f undamental First Amendment principles.
Although the constitutionality of the Leadership Act’s anti-prostitution requirement will turn on the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, at a broader level this limitation also af f ects global speech and
association. If the requirement is upheld, it will complicate and perhaps undermine global disease-prevention
ef f orts. Aid organizations claim that this requirement harms their credibility as NGOs operating in f oreign
nations, in part by f orcing them to adopt positions that of f end host nations and f oreign partners. It may also
turn prostitutes, the very constituency these groups seek to persuade, away f rom domestic and f oreign NGOs
that have been compelled to adopt policies expressly denouncing them. As applied to f oreign aid recipients,
the anti-prostitution requirement extends U.S. authority in a manner that af f ects how even non-U.S. f unds are
used in communicating about the provision of health services.

T he First Amendment’s domain has never been strictly or narrowly limited to domestic places and concerns.
First Amendment self -government, marketplace, and autonomy justif ications apply across and beyond
international borders. Particularly in an era of globalization and digitization, we need to think more expansively
in terms of global speech marketplaces, international commingling, and international inquiry. We ought to think
more caref ully about how domestic laws af f ect international speech marketplaces and various f orms of crossborder collaboration. In this environment, courts must be caref ul not to turn every utterance or activity that
touches or crosses international borders into an occasion f or f oreign af f airs or immigration def erence.
Interpretation of the First Amendment ought to f acilitate and encourage U.S. citizens’ active engagement with
the rest of the world. And it ought to be sensitive to the manner in which U.S. laws may alter or skew global
speech marketplaces.
T he Internet has been a unique catalyst in terms of encouraging this more cosmopolitan worldview. It has been
a tremendous boon to global f ree speech rights and democracy. However, we have launched into the Internet
era without f irst thinking through how our First Amendment relates to international borders and indeed to the
rest of the world. T hat, in the broadest terms, is my project.
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